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In a transforming economy there is a common legacy of most
companies: their low competitiveness as the result of an ob-
solete capital stock and overmanning, insufficient product
quality that does not satisfy demand, distorted specialization
patterns, high and partly ill-designed integration, suboptimal
size and inadequate management capacities. Restructuring
companies is therefore a challenging task.
The paper examines the painful adjustment process in east-
ern German manufacturing against the background of the
unpleasant trade-off between the pace of wage increase and
the level of transfer payments to spur investment and to fi-
nance consumption. The core question is how the perform-
ance of companies has developed with regard to ownership
structure, firm size and industry. The paper
• first, analyses the dilemma from a theoretical point of
view,
• second, highlights the economic repercussions of the
companies' adjustment behaviour to be mirrored in the
data, and
• third, draws the conclusions and provides some sugges-
tions for further analysis.
Data used in the paper mainly come from a sample of firms
under investigation of the Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschafts-
forschung (DIW), Berlin, since 1991 (P 52).I Introduction
1
Restructuring of companies in the transition from central planning to mar-
ket economy has proven to be an unprecedented challenge for busi-
nessmen and politicians alike. The socialist economy did not know "enter-
prises" in the usual sense, operating in a competitive environment under
a hard budget constraint. Rather were the big conglomerates and their
affiliates hierarchically structured and centrally commanded bureaucratic
constructions, largely financed by the state budget. As a result, they all
started into the process of marketization with a common legacy: low com-
petitiveness due to an obsolete capital stock and overmanning, insuf-
ficient product design and product quality, distorted specialization and
foreign trade orientation towards the former COMECON, high vertical and
horizontal integration, suboptimal plant size, insufficient management ca-
pacities and, as a result, huge financial constraints compared to the
needs [Jackson and Biesbrouck 1995]. Therefore, it is hardly surprising
that many of them are still grappling with the problem of how to achieve
break-even conditions.
This paper examines the painful process of restructuring in eastern Ger-
man manufacturing. As in all transition economies, the manufacturing
sector has been going through a deep crisis. Since summer 1990, when
the German Economic, Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU) was estab-
Research in preparation for this paper was undertaken with support from the European
Commission's Phare ACE Program 1995 "Emerging Market Organization and Corporate
Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe", project no. 94-0590-R. The empirical
material comes from a joint research project of the German Institute for Economic
Research (DIW), Berlin, the Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) and the Institute for
Economic Research Halle (IWH) commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs. The paper was prepared for a workshop held in Vienna from 6-7 Decem-
ber 1996.lished, industrial production has decreased by some
1 40 percent
(Figure 1). Without massive government support, things would even have
gone much worse. In this situation, there was only one possibility: to build
up a new manufacturing structure from scratch.
Figure 1 -Time Path of Production Adjustment in Eastern German
Manufacturing 1990-1996
alndex of industrial net production, quarterly, not seasonally adjusted. - Seasonally adjust-
ed.
Source: Central Statistical Office; own calculations.
In two respects, eastern Germany is a special case, not comparable to
transition countries in central and eastern Europe.
• On the one hand, the political decision to establish the Deutschmark
as currency at parity, and a sharp wage increase, bringing up eastern
Germany's unit labour costs to a level more than twice as high as in
the west, completely dashed the hopes for a smooth transition fromplan to market. The capital stock, which had some positive value
before GEMSU, was to a great extent depreciated overnight.
• On the other hand, the huge amount of public assistance spurred the
process of rebuilding the economy. Subsidies of about one third on
average for private investment represented a strong incentive for
western investors to engage themselves in eastern Germany.
Until now, there is no definite answer to the question whether the German
"shock-approach" will be — in terms of interactions between economics
and politics — more efficient than the "gradualistic approach" undertaken
by central and eastern European countries.
Although industrial production has increased steadily since summer 1992
and has passed the pre-unification level by now, this cannot be inter-
preted as a great success. Certainly, in becoming competitive, companies
have made some progress. However, the majority of them remains highly
delicate and dependent on government support. With respect to competi-
tiveness, there is still a large gap between companies in eastern and
western Germany. On average, eastern German companies have just
reached 55 percent of labour productivity of their western German com-
petitors (Table 1). As a result, eastern German industrial production con-
tributes only less than 10 percent to overall German industrial production;
according to the shares in total population, it should be twice as high. The
poor performance of eastern German companies is also reflected in the
changing sectoral picture which appears to be clearly biased towards non-
tradables industries not competing in global markets (Table 1). With for-
eign sales reaching only 12 percent of total sales, the export intensity of
the eastern German manufacturing sector is extremely low for a small
open economy (28 percent in western Germany). A rough calculation byNaujoks [1994] shows that in 1994, 57 percent of total sales by eastern
German companies were non-tradables whereas the share for western
German companies was 37 percent.
Table 1 - Index of Net Production
3 and Productivity Gap
b in Eastern
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Source: Central Statistical Office; own calculations.
Obviously, something goes wrong with the restructuring process in east-
ern Germany. The questions to be answered are: what are the main rea-
sons for the persistent competitive weakness? Do companies still suffer
from technological backwardness, from poor product design and quality,
from false market strategies, from missing economies of scale, from in-
sufficient financial resources, or, last but not least, from management fail-
ures caused by inexperienced entrepreneurs? These and other questionsshould now be put on top of the research agenda. In its own small way,
this paper tries to sketch the route for such type of research.
II Theoretical Background
In order to understand the long and troublesome restructuring process in
eastern Germany, it is necessary to focus once more on the special cir-
cumstances of the transition from plan to market. On the one hand, the
companies have been hit by the cost effect of an unrealistic rate of cur-
rency conversion and by a sharp increase in money wages. Under these
conditions, their chances for smoothly transforming into new viable struc-
tures were absolutely nil. With costs higher than sales, most of the com-
panies were virtually bankrupt. On the other hand, as a result of massive
public assistance, the opportunities for starting from scratch have been
more favourable than elsewhere. Assistance for corporate restructuring
has been designed with two effective spearheads: rapid privatization and
heavy subsidization of investment in the capital stock. By that, ailing com-
panies obtained what they urgently needed: fresh money for a promising
new beginning.
However, there has been a considerable degree of asymmetry with re-
spect to adjustment needs and adjustment opportunities. Generally, com-
panies in manufacturing industries have been much more affected by the
shocks than those in service industries, which are more or less shielded
from international or nation-wide competition. In addition, companies in
service industries have been heavily benefiting from massive transfer
payments poured into eastern Germany for consumptive purposes, be-
cause they are mainly operating in local and regional markets.Figure 2 - Relative Price Change and Structural Change in a Two-Factor
















NT, NTEG NTThe situation after GEMSU can be described best by a simple model
which was developed in different forms by Greiner, MaB and Sell [1994],
Naujoks [1994], Klodt, Stehn et al. [1995] and Sell [1995]. The model al-
lows to distinguish between the supply and demand effects caused by
GEMSU and those caused by investive and consumptive subsidies
(Figure 2).
• In characterizing the situation shortly before and after GEMSU, it is
assumed that the GDR economy was producing two types of goods:
- tradables (7) and non-tradables (NT). The production possibilities are
defined by the transformation curve (TC), the allocation by the struc-
ture of relative prices (PGDR). AS usual in a socialist economy, the
price structure was heavily distorted in favour of tradables. Thus, the
transition to a market economy led to a shift of the price vector to
PEG', the prices for tradables decreased because they are determined
by the world market, while the prices for non-tradables increased be-
cause they are determined by domestic resource costs and local de-
mand conditions. At the same time the production possibilities fron-
tier receded, visualized by a downward shift of the transformation
curve. It is evident that this shift was more pronounced in the trad-
ables sector being heavily affected by competition from abroad than
in the non-tradables sector.
• The downward shift of the transformation curve would have implied a
conversion rate of less than 1:1, say 1:2 or 1:3 as it was suggested
for nominal wages, in order to bring the consumption possibilities of
easterners in line with production possibilities. However, due to the
sharp wage increase, consumption possibilities increased consid-
erably which is illustrated by a move of the budget point SGDR to a'EG-Since the demand exceeded the supply of domestic goods, eastern
Germany's balance of trade ran into a deficit, which had to be fi-
nanced by transfer payments from western Germany — the line be-
tween SEG and S'EG on the Engel curve gives a description of the
amount of fiscal transfer necessary to close the gap between con-
sumption and production.
• As a result of huge fiscal transfers from west to east, the resource
allocation shifted once again from tradables to non-tradables produc-
ing sectors: since prices for tradables are determined by the world
market, the increase in consumptive demand affected only the prices
for non-tradables, illustrated by an additional shift of the vector of
relative prices from P'EG to P"EG-
In the end, currency conversion and wage adjustment have not only de-
stroyed a large part of the productive potential of the tradables producing
sector. In combination with transfer payments, they are also a severe ob-
stacle to restructuring it: investors have more incentives to commit to the
non-tradables producing sector. So far, eastern Germany suffers from im-
mense allocative distortions which can be labelled as a Dutch disease
problem [Siebert 1995]..
Ill Data Base
The examination of the complex adjustment process is a very challenging
task for researchers. It requires an appropriate informational base. Ideali-
ter, a data base on the firm-level should be available. Realiter, however,
the German Central Statistical Office provides only data on an aggregate
level — by industries or by firm size — as data protection legislation in
Germany is very strict. Therefore, the German Institute for Economic Re-search (DIW), Berlin, and the Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW),
commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs to. monitor the
adjustment process in eastern Germany, decided to establish their own
survey.
2 The first survey was started in summer 1991 with a sample of
1,700 manufacturing companies, the fourth in spring 1995 with
2,500 companies.
3 In terms of employees, some 25 percent of the manu-
facturing sector were included. It can be assumed that the respondents
form a representative sub-sample although the whole population is still
unknown with respect to those variables which are considered most rele-
vant in our paper.
In principle, the surveys can be considered as a panel since it is tried to
keep the population of the sample stable. However, due to enormous
fluctuations in the eastern German enterprise sphere — at the beginning,
panel mortality as well as panel entry were very high — only a relatively
small proportion of the panel members have longitudinal records without
missing years. A fairly stable panel of respondents only exists as from
1994.
The design of the survey makes various approaches possible:
• On the descriptive level, it is possible to examine how different types
of companies perform — for instance with respect to ownership, plant
size or industry. In this context it is possible to answer the following
questions: do companies in the ownership of western German com-
panies perform better than other companies? Can small-sized corn-
Data collecting and data processing have been carried out by the DIW.
The fifth wave was started in summer 1996. The results will be available at the end of
1996.10
panies cope better with wage costs than large-sized ones? Have pri-
vate or privatized companies invested more than Treuhand compa-
nies?
• On the explanatory level, it is possible to test the relationships be-
tween the different sets of variables in a systematic manner. For in-
stance, in which way has restructuring influenced productivity and
profitability of companies? To what extent have financial constraints
hampered necessary investments? Have subsidies caused allocative
distortions, in particular overcapacities?
Nevertheless, there are some limitations which result from the survey
techniques: the information is collected by a questionnaire sent by mail.
Inevitably, a questionnaire cannot be too complex, covering all the areas
under examination — it should not include more than 25 fully structured
questions. Additionally, in order to get a high rate of return, it is necessary
to avoid crucial questions. It is well known that companies are usually
markedly reticent about their balance sheets and profit and loss values.
Therefore, only little quantitative information concerning turnover, invest-
ment and employment is available.
IV Main Findings
The basic philosophy of restructuring the eastern German economy is that
monies can buy anything, even time. For political and economic reasons,
there was no time to adopt a gradualistic strategy. Therefore, the strategy
for pushing the restructuring was designed with two spearheads: rapid
privatization of state-owned companies and heavy subsidization of in-
vestment in the capital stock [Schmidt 1996].11
• The guideline for rapid privatization was to find an investor being able
to transform an ailing into a viable company. In the words of its
President, the strategy of the Treuhandanstalt (a government trus-
teeship which had been responsible for privatization) was not selling
companies but buying investors. "We give preference to an investor if
he has access to sales channels, if he can close the innovation and
the technology gap ... as quickly as possible and thus enable the
company to survive" [Breuel 1992]. With an estimated deficit of
270 bn DM this operation has ended deeply in the red.
• The motivation for heavy subsidization was to give necessary incen-
tives to invest. Private investors were not in a hurry to invest their
money in eastern Germany, except in those industries which prom-
ised quick profits, such as retail trade and real estate. As a rule, they
had to take into account negative externalities in form of the poor
state of traffic and communication infrastructure, bottlenecks in the
administrative organization or difficulties in clearing up the restitution
claims. Until now, total transfers to eastern Germany amounted to
roughly 1 trillion DM of which 350 billion DM were paid for financing
public and subsidizing private investment.
It is important to understand privatization and subsidization as a package:
since a government institution would not have been able to restructure
thousands of bankrupt companies, it had to buy private investors for doing
so. Without massive subsidies, such a process of restructuring would not
have started quickly.12
1 Ownership Structure and Overall Performance
The importance of rapid privatization for the restructuring process is im-
pressively documented by the changing pattern of the ownership status of
companies (Table 2). In summer 1991 still 86 percent of eastern German
manufacturing companies with 92 percent of total employees were in the
ownership of the Treuhandanstalt. Until spring 1995 the share has been
brought down to 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Interestingly, the
overwhelming majority of previously state-owned companies were privat-
ized, not reprivatized to former rightful owners. Although the Privatization
Law provided for restitution to assume priority before fresh privatization,
this has been partly overturned by the so-called Investment Act and, re-
spectively, Investment Priority Act. Since the government was interested
in quick restructuring, the former owner, as a rule, was only given prefer-
ence if he agreed to make the same investments as another would-be in-
vestor. As a consequence, many former owners, not willing or able to in-
vest much money, were pushed into a subordinate position compared to
those potential purchasers promising high investments.
Privatization in the transition process involved both privatizing existing
companies and founding new companies. Meanwhile, new firms' start-ups
have clearly surpassed the number of previously existing companies.
However, these obvious dynamics seem to be mostly restricted to the
category of small and medium sized companies because they only ac-
count for 20 percent of all employees in total manufacturing as opposed to
60 percent in privatized Treuhand companies.dies Institute
for Weltwirtschaft Kiel
Table 2 - Firms and Employees in the Eastern German Manufacturing






Private firms before 1990
Firms founded after 1989





Firms owned by western
































































































In spring 1995, more than two thirds of all private companies in eastern
German manufacturing were "independent" units in the hands of eastern
German owners. But here again eastern Germans seem to focus mainly
on small-scale production, in particular in the craft sector: "independent"
companies only account for 45 percent of employees as opposed to
50 percent in "dependent" firms of western German-owned or foreign-
owned companies.
The object of comparison in this paper is the performance of certain types
of companies included in the sample relative to other types. However,
performance is a fuzzy concept which can be defined in several ways.
Since the questionnaire could not cover more than a few areas set out
under the heading of this variable, there are necessarily some restrictions.
As proxy for performance, a bundle of characteristics is used such as the
assessment of companies with regard to their competitiveness, their size
of order books, their use of capacity and, last but not least, their profitabil-
ity.Table 3 - Shares of East German Manufacturing Firms Facing






Private firms before 1990
Firms founded after 1989
Note:
Independent firms
Firms owned by western German or
foreign companies
Firms-owned by the Treuhandanstalt or its
successor organizations
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According to the survey findings, all categories of companies, privatized,
re-privatized and newly founded ones, are facing serious competitiveness15
problems (Table 3). Although their situation has improved significantly
over recent years, more than half of the companies stated in spring 1995
that they were experiencing great difficulties maintaining their market po-
sition. For comparison: in summer 1991 the share was almost 90 percent.
A closer look, however, reveals a somewhat different picture:
• Companies owned by the Treuhand or by the Treuhand successor
organizations have been the least competitive: from summer 1991
until winter 1993/94, companies facing problems formed a great ma-
jority (more than 80 percent). This is not surprising because compa-
nies that took a long time to get privatized or companies that have
not been privatized at all so far are on the whole the least promising
ones. They often belong to sectors which in western countries have
been in a crisis for a long time. More striking, however, is the fact that
the share of companies having trouble with competitiveness declined
sharply from 82 percent in winter 1993/94 to 53 percent in spring
1995, which is even below the share relevant to reprivatized compa-
nies, viz. 65 percent. This may be explained by the fact that recently,
many loss-making Treuhand companies, which did not find an inves-
tor, were closed down.
• Reprivatized companies do not seem to be better off than non-privat-
ized companies: in 1993/94 and 1995 more than 60 percent were
facing competitive problems. Frequently, these companies had to be
handed over to the heirs of the former owner who often had no expe-
rience or even no interest in running a business successfully. This
may support the view that the partial replacement of restitution by
fresh privatization under the Investment Act and, respectively, the In-
vestment Priority Act proved its worth. However, the poor perform-16
ance may also be explained by poor starting conditions: the owners
of reprivatized companies often complained that, because they had
to accept historic debts or the damage of historic pollution, they were
often treated worse than investors in fresh privatizations, which were
partly or completely let off these obligations by the Treuhandanstalt
[Muller 1996].
4
Companies privately owned before 1989 or founded thereafter have
started more successfully into the market economy compared to
-previous Treuhand companies. Clearly, these companies have suf-
fered less from the heritage of the past than former state-owned
companies. As they are small in size, they have often found a profit-
able niche. Nevertheless, the first category has more and more diffi-
culties in withstanding market pressure. The declining performance
of the older companies is mainly a structural problem, as they are ex-
clusively operating in the traditional retail trade and crafts-sector, the
only private business which was of some importance in the GDR.
Finally, western German- or foreign-owned companies report com-
petitiveness problems to a lower degree than independent compa-
nies in the ownership of easterners. However, the difference between
the two categories is smaller than might have been expected. At first
glance, the ownership by a western partner does not appear to be a
crucial advantage. However, this result may be affected by other
variables such as firm size or type of industry, considering that the
Treuhandanstalt tended to sell large companies, in particular in "sen-
The majority of companies had already been transferred to their former owners in the
short time from January to March 1990 during which the Modrow government was in
power.17
sitive branches", mostiy to westerners. Data evaluated suggest that
restructuring these companies is more painful than restructuring
small and medium sized companies in other branches.
Some problems have proved particularly thorny throughout the years of
restructuring: the rapid wage increase, the persistent or even rising pres-
sure of competition and the severe financial constraints (Table 4). Often
these problems are strongly interrelated: frequently increasing costs are
causal for the growing competitive pressure and this again is causal for
profit and liquidity squeezes.
Table 4 - Selected Problems Perceived by Eastern German
Manufacturing Firms 1991-1995
Customers in arrears
Shortage of equity capital
Rising pressure of competition
Liquidity crisis
Wages and salaries rising too fast
Lack of finance for investments
Lack of skilled labour
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On the other hand, the share of companies operating with outdated plants
and insufficient distribution facilities has clearly declined. This suggests
that initial steps in the restructuring process have been successful. What
has to come next are the steps of consolidation — for instance: raising18
productivity and cutting costs, penetrating markets, realizing scale econo-
mies and/last but not least, turning losses into profits and widening the
base of equity capital.
2 Productivity Gap and Wage Pressure
After reunification, a quick adjustment of east German real wages to the
west German level was seen as an important strategy in order to prevent
massive migration from east to west. By now, eastern German effective
wages have reached on average 75 percent of western German wages.
This is a particularly grave problem because productivity is substantially
lagging behind: despite heavy capital investment, it has reached only
about 55 percent of the western German level. This results in unit labour
costs which are 35 percent higher than in the west.
However, data suggest that only less than one half of the companies
consider rising labour costs a serious problem. Obviously, the spread in
wages paid by companies as well as in productivity is very wide. There-
fore, it might be interesting to examine which categories of companies are
especially prone to suffering from this problem. As a proxy for wage cost
pressure the assessment of companies with respect to their profit situa-
tion was used (Table 5).
• Looking first at the ownership status, one can conclude that private
firms founded before as well as after the collapse of the old system
have less trouble to cope with rising labour costs than previous or
current Treuhand firms. Only a relatively small share of private firms
report significant losses, almost one half reached reasonable or small
profits. Clearly, these firms are not suffering from the heritage of the
past. The result is not self-evident, though.19
Looking second at firm size, the picture becomes much clearer:
smaller firms, most of which were newly founded, are operating on
average in a more profitable way than larger ones. One reason for
this is that smaller firms have more opportunities than larger ones to
find a profitable niche. More important, however, is that the over-
whelming majority of these firms falls short of paying standard
wages. They avoid becoming members of the employers associa-
tions and can, therefore, fix individual agreements with their workers.
Looking finally at the type of industry, it can be said that companies
facing tough international competition are most heavily afflicted by
the wage pressure problem. Apart from companies in old-fashioned
industries like iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and foundries or
textiles and clothing, a high share of eastern German companies in
industries which should have a good standing on international mar-
kets, like chemicals and mechanical engineering, report significant
losses, too. In contrast, companies in construction-related branches,
which mainly serve the booming local market, report a more positive
profit situation. Exceptions are given on the one hand by the vehicle
building industry, an internationally competing industry which shows a
satisfactory profit situation due to newly established, highly produc-
tive plants owned by western German companies and, on the other
hand, by the industries producing food, beverages and tobacco,
which include a surprisingly high share of firms reporting significant
losses, although they are mainly serving local markets.20
Table 5 - The Profit Situation Perceived by Eastern German
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Actually, companies are in a permanent race against rising wage pres-
sure. At the beginning of the restructuring process, they were very suc-
cessful. They were able to substantially increase productivity by reducing
overemployment. However, this potential is now exhausted. In order to re-
duce the huge gap compared to their competitors in the west, they have21
to invest massively. In fact, investment activity has been impressive. In
recent years about 30,000 DM per employee and per year have been in-
vested on average, 50 percent more than in western German manufactur-
ing (Table 6). Although the dynamics has somewhat declined since 1993,
the level of investments has remained relatively high.
Table 6 - Investment per Employee
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However, aggregate figures conceal once more major differences be-
tween categories of companies:
• One striking difference is that between independent and western
German- or foreign-owned firms: investment per employee of the
latter exceeded that of the former by more than 20,000 DM in 199322
and by more than 10,000 DM in 1994 and 1995. This is mainly the
result of severe financial constraints of independent eastern German
firms, which do not exist for affiliates of western German or foreign
companies. On the other hand, investment in western German- or
foreign-owned companies seems to be much more volatile as to
economic repercussions than investment in independent firms, which
has basically remained constant over the given period.
• Another striking difference is that between small and large compa-
nies. Surprisingly, small firms invested much more than large ones.
This can probably be explained by the fact that small firms are usu-
ally young firms which started from scratch. They have to build up a
certain capital stock before becoming workable. Later, they have to
increase their capacities in accordance with their growing business
activities.
Another significant difference between small and large, respectively
young and old companies are their diverging investment objectives
(Table 7). The small and, respectively, young ones invested a relatively
high share for reasons of expansion, the large and, respectively, old ones
for reasons of replacement. Investment in companies in the hands of the
Treuhandanstalt or its successor organizations, which reported surpris-
ingly large figures of investment per employee in 1993 and 1994, was by
almost two thirds dedicated to modernization and rationalization. These
companies were also subject to extensive restructuring measures. By this
sort of "window dressing" the Treuhandanstalt tried to attract potential in-
vestors.23







Private firms before 1990
Firms founded after 1989
Firms owned by Treuhand-successors
Note:
Independent firms
Firms owned by western German or foreign firms
Size













































Nevertheless, in terms of productivity increase, the results of the enor-
mous efforts taken are disappointing. Certainly, at the end of 1995 output
per worker was three times as high as at the end of 1990. This, however,
was mainly due to the massive cuts in the volume of working hours, a
process which was more or less finished by the end of 1993. More re-
cently/the rise in productivity significantly slowed down. The gap in terms
of unit labour costs has not yet narrowed; in the second half of 1996 it has
even widened. Against the background of the enormous investments
which have been implemented, this is not easy to explain. Although the
capital stock per employee is still much lower than in western German
manufacturing — on average it has reached a level of about 60 per-
cent _ this does not seem to be the main problem. According to the sur-
veys, the proportioh of companies with outdated plants and equipment is
in decline: in spring 1995 it amounted to one quarter only. Interestingly,
the proportion of companies which report a backlog in modernizing busi-
ness premises, machinery and vehicle fleet is the highest among the24
small independent firms — where investment per capita is clearly above
that of larger companies. It is not easy to solve this puzzle.
3 Firm Size and Market Access
There is some evidence that the origin of the problems must be sought
not only on the supply side but also on the demand side. Many companies
complain about insufficient sales opportunities. Such companies are to be
found in every branch and every size category, in independent firms and
in western German- and foreign-owned subsidiaries. However, very small
and very large companies tend to suffer somewhat more from a weak
market position than the other size categories:
• On average, 20 percent of all companies reported in spring 1995 that
their order situation was unsatisfactory, among firms with 1 to 9 em-
ployees the share even amounted to 27 percent (Table 8). The same
holds with respect to capacity utilization where the figures were
29 percent and 39 percent, respectively. Obviously, very small firms
have more difficulty in finding access to market and maintaining their
market position than larger ones. This might be due to their lack of
resources, which makes it tough for them to build up and develop
market activities, distribution channels and, last but not least, reputa-
tion. As a matter of consequence, these firms find it extremely diffi-
cult to be admitted to the procurement lists of the major retail chain
stores, which usually expect from their suppliers just-in-time deliver-
ies, large series of standardized products, customizing and sales
promotion activities. Not surprisingly, the very small companies suffer
more than their larger competitors from an unsatisfactory utilization of25
capacities which — per se — pushes up overhead costs and affects
price competitiveness.
• The sales problems of very large companies of 500 and more em-
ployees — 29 percent complained about their unsatisfactory order
situation and 33 percent about their weak capacity utilization — are
different from those of very small firms. As already stated, this cate-
gory includes many companies that are hard to privatize or that con-
tinue to be in the ownership of the Treuhandanstalt's successors.
Many of these companies are operating in branches suffering from
structural overcapacities such as chemicals, iron and steel and ship-
building which still have to undergo fundamental restructuring, includ-
ing reduction of overcapacities.
There is not much evidence for the hypothesis that western German- or
foreign-owned companies have better access to markets and to global
networks of production than independent firms. Privatized firms give on
average a positive report concerning use of capacity and situation of or-
ders — in contrast to re-privatized ones that account for the highest share
of all firms assessing their use of capacity and also their order situation as
"rather bad". This is possibly due to the lack of motivation and experience
of the heirs of the former owners, which causes deficiencies concerning
market access. The most successful firms in terms of use of capacity and
orders are those founded after 1989. Three important factors might have
contributed to their success: first, the. fact that newly founded firms in
eastern Germany are concentrated in the most promising branches,
namely serving only local markets or being related to the booming con-
struction sector; second, that these firms benefit from the motivation and
qualification of their owners; and third, that they are not burdened with the26
heritage of the past like many of their competitors which already existed
under the socialist regime.
Table 8 - Capacity Utilization and Order Situation as seen by Eastern
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4 Geographic Distance and Market Shares
The main problem for eastern German companies is their low competi-
tiveness in interregional and international markets. The main sales mar-
kets are local and regional markets in eastern Germany — almost half of
the overall turnover was realized there in 1995. Another third was attained27
in western Germany. Western and eastern foreign markets still play a
subordinate role. Since 1993 there has been a shift in regional sales
structures in favour of western German markets but not in favour of inter-
national markets (Table 9).
Table 9 - Regional Distribution of Turnover of East German
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It,is not surprising that small firms, in particular, tend to demonstrate their
competence on local rather than on nation-wide and international mar-28
kets: in 1995, firms with less than 9 employees achieved 55 percent of
their total turnover within a radius of 30 kms. However, larger firms — and
among them even companies owned by western German or foreign com-
panies — have a relatively high share of their customers in the vicinity. As
a consequence, the total share of firms locating their main competitors
nearby is considerable.
These figures indicate that a competitive export base has not yet been
established. Too many companies have lost most of their traditional ex-
port-markets in the former socialist economies, but until now too few have
found access to those in western market economies. To a certain extent,
this might reflect the suboptimal size and branch structure of eastern
German manufacturing: the very high share of smaller firms and branches
not producing for supra-regional markets. But this might also express a
lack of competitiveness which makes itself felt on international markets
rather than on local markets.
There is a general lesson to be learned from this for the process of re-
structuring: quick privatization and heavy subsidization are not enough to
guarantee an immediate success in the hunt for market shares on a
global level. Establishing a firm position in nation-wide and international
markets obviously requires some competition experience which can only
be gained with time. As stated above, entering international markets is a
stepwise process and the state cannot force it by granting high financing
support. Money cannot buy everything, various things need time.
5 Restructuring and Financial Problems
Since many companies are operating in the red it is not surprising that
they face heavy financial constraints, too. The lack of financial resources29
is a general problem of companies in the transition process: However,
companies in eastern Germany started well-equipped into the market
economy. During the process of privatization, the companies were
dressed with equity capital by the Treuhandanstalt (according to the nor-
mal level in western Germany) and were released from old debts. It was
expected that the capital base thus obtained would enable the companies
to survive the troublesome restructuring period until they would become
competitive on their own.
However, persistently poor market performance and cost pressure, mainly
due to wage increase, caused the capital base to be eaten up fast and left
many companies with financial constraints. This can be seen in Table 4,
where problems related to finance, i.e. lack of equity, lack of;liquidity,
customers in arrears and lack of finance for investment, appear among
the six foremost problems which companies covered by this survey re-
ported in spring 1995. .
The strong correlation between wage pressure and competition pressure
on the one hand and financial constraints on the other, can also be de-
rived from Table 10: 49 percent of the companies in the survey suffering
from rising wages and 51 percent of those suffering from increasing com-
petition reported a significant shortage of equity at the same time. A
specific characteristic of those companies is their weakness concerning
field sales and distribution. In order to gain access to nation-wide and in-
ternational markets, companies need financial resources to develop their
own distribution channels and marketing activities so that they can over-
come major problems with sales and distribution, customer service and
product image. If these resources are scarce, companies do not have a
chance to attract customers, to improve their profit situation and to build30
up a capital base on their own. Moreover, if the share of equity capital in a
firm is low and the share of loan capital high, the well-known leverage risk
causes a deterioration of the profit situation and a higher risk of the firm
going bankrupt.
In a world of perfect markets, companies could easily satisfy their demand
on the capital market. However, there are two main barriers for compa-
nies in eastern Germany which do not benefit from the international re-
sources of a parent company to overcome their financial constraints: on
the-institutional side, the market for risk capital for companies which do
not have access to the organized spot markets is underdeveloped; on the
market side, eastern German companies, especially those which were
newly founded and those which already have a poor equity base, present
a considerable risk for banks because the probability of a failure of such
companies is high. Thus, many banks are very reluctant to provide credit,
leaving them with a lack of financial resources, which are necessary for
them to invest and to build up a potential for market access. This gives
rise to a kind of vicious circle: without a clear perspective of successful
market performance, firms remain in the "high-risk category" and find it
more and more difficult to get access to the banks' credit facilities. In this
case, the only way for companies to obtain the necessary capital resour-
ces is by finding access to special government support programs.31
Table 10 - Independent East German Manufacturing Firms with.and
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At first glance, the overall picture might suggest that in recent years the
distribution of those companies that can withstand competitive pressure
without great difficulty and those companies that are clearly facing prob-
lems has remained virtually unchanged. However, the results from a
longitudinal evaluation — included were only companies which could be
clearly identified in the two surveys of 1993 and 1995— reveal some di-
verging trends.
Roughly one third of the companies experiencing significant competi-
tiveness problems in 1993 had overcome them in 1995, two thirds
have not made a decisive progress (Table 11).
- Two fifths of the companies that, by and large, were operating without
serious problems in 1993 suffered from such problems two years
later.
From the longitudinal evaluation we can learn that the scenery is still in
motion: many of the companies have improved their situation in recent
years, while many others have experienced a deterioration. Although es-
pecially companies owned by west German or foreign companies have,
as it seems, been able to cope with their problems, there is no dominating
pattern: all types of companies appear to be more or less susceptible to
competitiveness pressure.33
Table 11 - East German Manufacturing Firms
a having Competitiveness
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The fundamental economic problem in eastern Germany is the inade-
quate competitiveness of many manufacturing companies. The most evi-
dent symptoms are, compared to western German companies, high (unit)
labour costs, low sales and severe financial constraints. Rapid privatiza-
tion and massive subsidization of investments, the two spearheads of the
policy for German unification, have partly failed their targets. Corporate
restructuring in eastern Germany is increasingly a Herculean task requir-
ing money and time.
Table 12 - Total Costs
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Source: Central Statistical Office.
What has to happen if German unification is to prove an economic suc-
cess after all? There is no lack of government support for the eastern
German industry. It is the rapid upward adjustment of wages to the west-
ern levels that is making it so difficult to swiftly raise competitiveness. As
the results from the official Cost-Structure Statistics suggest, the compa-35
nies are operating deeply in the red —with total costs exceeding gross
output by about one tenth in 1994 (Table 12). . .
The problem is the grotesque mismatch between absorption and produc-
tion or between transfer for supporting consumption and for supporting in-
vestment. As a result, the non-tradables, not the tradables sector has at-
tracted most of the capital and qualified labour-force and has made the
most rapid progress in the restructuring process. From the model devel-
oped in section II of our paper, we can learn that there are only two pos-
sibilities for overcoming this problem:
• First: the government could stop all consumptive transfers to eastern
Germany. This would bring consumption possibilities of easterners in
line with output possibilities and — as a result — change the relative
prices and the allocation in favour of tradables. It is evident that there
is no realistic chance for implementing such a strategy.
• Second: the government could concentrate its support on trad-
ables — on companies operating in supra-regional markets. Accord-
ingly, many German economists and policy makers are in favour of
prioritizing companies in the "export sector", which might include
many branches of the manufacturing industry, but also some bran-
ches of producer-related services. The crucial point is: it is virtually
impossible to accurately identify companies constituting the export
basis of a region according to operational criteria. Frequently,
so-called "local players" are important links to export chains as was
shown in the literature on industrial districts.36
Obviously, a government cannot reach both targets at the same time: to
promote easterners' possibilities to consume and their opportunities to
produce.
As long as eastern Germany's manufacturing industry remains weak, the
other sectors will be unable to grow to the extent required, and it will prove
impossible to reduce the huge current account deficit with the rest of the
world. Thus, progress in the manufacturing industry is, in the final analy-
sis, the yardstick by which the success of the transformation from a cen-
trally planned to a self-sustaining and prosperous market economy is to
be measured. Seen from this perspective, the ultimate aim of the transfor-
mation is still a long way off.37
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